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Public private partnerships for healthcare infrastructure and related services:  
a review of benefits and costs 
 





Although the use of PPPs is endorsed by agencies at the national and supranational levels, there is 
little guidance for decision-makers on what good outcomes look like and the circumstances in which 
such outcomes are likely to occur. Enhanced understanding of these issues can improve the 
governance of large-scale contracting in the health sector. Drawing on a narrative review of the 
available theoretical and empirical research, this paper evaluates: (1) the benefits that PPPs generate 
compared to alternative mechanisms of delivery; (2) their additional costs; and (3) the endogenous 
and exogenous factors that influence these outcomes. The evidence shows that PPPs hold promise for 
decision-makers who prioritise certainty. However, PPPs are also associated with additional 
transaction and financing costs. The key decision that policymakers and managers need to make 
about their use of the PPP model is, therefore, how much extra they are prepared to pay to achieve 
predictable cost, quality and service outcomes. How much they will have to pay is a function of a set 
of contextual variables which are readily amenable to policy action. 
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Increasingly, health sector policymakers are engaged in public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) in which private companies are contracted by governments to finance and deliver new 
health infrastructure and related services (Acerete et al., 2012). This model of PPP originated 
in high-income countries, such as Australia, Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
but is now a routine form of procurement in many other jurisdictions (Hellowell, 2012). 
Although the use of PPPs is endorsed by governments and agencies at both national 
and supranational levels (Montagu and Harding, 2012), the evidence about their outcomes is 
mixed (Roehrich et al, 2014), and there is little guidance for decision-makers on the 
circumstances in which the model is likely to deliver good outcomes. Better understanding of 
these issues within healthcare organisations is needed to ensure that appropriate PPP 
strategies are selected, and that the related processes are well-designed and managed.  
This article begins to address this need, and draws on a narrative review1 of 
theoretical and empirical research in order to evaluate: (1) the benefits that PPPs can 
                                                          
1 The search strategy focused on theoretical and empirical studies that provide insights relevant to the 
operation of PPPs in the health sector, even if they do not focus on the health sector directly (see Roehrich et al, 
2014 for a systematic review of PPPs in the health sector). Peer reviewed literature was obtained from online 
bibliographic databases, alongside reference lists from papers obtained in database searches. In addition, the 
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generate compared to alternative mechanisms of delivery; (2) the sources of additional costs; 
and (3) the endogenous and exogenous factors that influence these outcomes.  
 
2. BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
The economic case for the PPP model resides in its ability to allocate the risks associated with 
delivering infrastructure and related services more effectively than other approaches. If it 
does so, the model may reduce the whole-life costs of providing goods at a given quality 
(Välilä, 2005). The transfer of risk is normally achieved in two ways. First, the payment to the 
private operator is made as, when, and to the extent that the outputs specified in the 
contract are delivered, creating an incentive for the operator to ensure that the goods being 
purchased are routinely available for use at the agreed standard (Farquharson et al, 2011). 
 Accordingly, while the payment to the private operator is, effect, a prospective global 
budget,2 it is paid retrospectively and includes an element that is conditional on performance 
– specifically, performance in terms of the availability and quality of contracted assets and 
services (Hellowell et al, 2015). Therefore, if the payment is linked to key performance 
indicators that are well-specified and measurable (De Bettignies and Ross 2004, 2011), and 
adequate arrangements are in place for the monitoring and verification of performance 
(Domberger and Jensen 1997), and contractual relations are broadly equitable between the 
parties (Lonsdale and Watson 2007), then any failure of the private operator to achieve 
specified outcomes results in financial losses (Reiss 2015). The operator has a strong 
incentive to avoid losses and, therefore, to deliver on its contractually-specified obligations. 
Second, as the payment mechanism effectively caps the operator’s total income, 
there is an incentive for the operator to minimise its costs of production. Furthermore, a 
distinctive feature of PPPs is that they ‘bundle’ together a range of activities (design, 
construction, operations & maintenance, and various categories of service provision) in a 
single contract, such that the operator of a PPP has both the capability and the incentive to 
exploit economies of scope (Schleifer 1998, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 2003, Iossa and 
Martimort, 2012), for example by investing in innovations which lower production costs or 
enhance quality (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser 2009).3 If it is further assumed that bidding 
processes are competitive, and private operators can foresee the opportunities to minimise 
costs, the incentive framework may reduce the price of contracts for the purchaser.  
However, empirical evidence on the question of whether PPPs can be relied on to 
deliver lower costs and better quality in comparison with alternative mechanisms is mixed 
(Acerete et al., 2012). In general, the evidence suggests that PPPs hold promise for decision-
makers that wish to achieve greater certainty over outcomes such as cost, quality and service 
volumes than may be achievable via alternative mechanisms of delivery (National Audit 
                                                          
websites of a number of organisations, including supranational agencies, government ministries and official 
audit bodies, were searched, and relevant reports and briefings were included in the review.  
2 That is, the payment rate is agreed before the delivery of goods and is based on the forecast costs of 
production for the private operator, including the cost of capital. However, billing and payment take place after 
the delivery of goods. 
3 It may also be noted that the PPP model may help to address incentive problems within the public sector in 
terms of a tendency to allow the liability associated with the need to replace fully or almost fully depreciated 
assets to be deferred to future generations. 
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Office 2003; 2005). Certainty over outcomes is evidently a different matter to how desirable 
are those outcomes (National Audit Office, 2010). After all, a project that delivers the 
specified goods on budget may still represent poor value for money if the price paid for these 
outcomes (by society or by specific purchasers) is too high (Hellowell, 2010). And there is, as 
yet, no conclusive evidence that PPPs have, on average, led to lower costs or contract prices.4  
One potential reason is that the bundling and risk-transfer features of the PPP model 
do not appear to have led to the kind of cost-reducing innovations predicted by theory. 
Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2009) undertook interviews to investigate the degree of 
innovation in the design and construction of PPP hospitals in the UK. They examined evidence 
from six case studies drawn from early PPP schemes, the identities of which were not 
revealed. The study showed that, in the view of many contractual stakeholders, the 
dominance of financial players in project delivery decision served to stifle innovation. The 
study concluded that PPPs had led to a fragmentation in responsibilities and an inefficient 
allocation of risks which, far from encouraging innovation, had in fact impeded innovation.  
 
 
3. SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL COSTS 
There are several features of the PPP model which may generate additional costs. The most 
important are transaction costs and finance costs (i.e. the costs of deploying private capital).5  
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework, pioneered by Oliver Williamson 
(1985; 1990), has been used to provide an account of why PPPs are likely to be associated 
with higher transaction costs than other forms of delivery (Lonsdale, 2005). In the TCE 
framework, economic actors – buyers and sellers - are constrained by bounded rationality, 
while the self-interest orientation of actors is characterised by opportunism, or “self-interest 
seeking with guile” (Williamson 1985, p.47-8). When opportunism on the part of buyers and 
sellers is combined with bounded rationality, either of the parties may be able to take 
advantage of lacunae in the other’s knowledge to further its pecuniary interests.  
The impact of these behavioural factors on outcomes is dependent on two 
dimensions of the transaction: asset specificity (i.e. the extent to which investments by the 
parties are specific to the transaction) and uncertainty (e.g. the extent to which current 
objectives are subject to change). In a PPP, both asset-specificity and uncertainty are high. In 
the former case, both parties face considerable switching costs if they wish to withdraw from 
the deal (see section 3 for an example). In the latter case, the duration and scope of contracts 
                                                          
4 The majority economic theorists that have examined these issues have taken a social welfare perspective 
when considering costs (Schleifer 1998, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 2003, Iossa and Martimort, 2012). 
Hence, the focus of analysis is on whether PPPs are likely to reduce the consumption of society’s real resources 
relative to alternative mechanisms - and not whether the price paid by the government purchaser is likely to be 
lower (Hellowell, 2015). There is very little theoretical research on this latter question, despite its obvious 
relevance for decision-makers. A notable exception is Ross and Ying (2015) in which it is recognised that the 
government’s objective may be to get the right project delivered for the lowest cost to taxpayers rather than to 
maximize total social surplus. 
5 Under project finance, providers of debt are paid only from the project company’s revenues, without 
recourse to the providers of equity. That is, the project company’s obligations are ring-fenced from those of the 
equity investors, and debt is secured on the cash flows of the project. These structures involve a large 
proportion of debt - and the overall cost of capital tends to be higher than in corporate finance structures. 
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ensure that, in a rapidly changing industry such as healthcare, there a strong likelihood of 
contractual incompleteness and a need for renegotiation during the contract (Lonsdale 
2005). In this context, the TCE framework predicts that the processes of contract negotiation 
and monitoring will be extensive, and involve substantial costs for both buyers and sellers. 
Dudkin and Välilä (2005) showed that a sample of PPPs undertaken in the UK 
generated higher transaction costs in the pre-contractual phase – about 10% of the capital 
expenditure value of the project, on average, for both contracting authorities and preferred 
bidders, and up to 5% of that value for losing bidders - than other forms of procurement. 
They attributed this to their longer-term character, greater financial complexity and distinct 
emphasis on risk-sharing, all of which will tend to increase tendering and negotiating costs.6 
Turning to the private finance component of the PPP model, sources of additional cost 
may include transaction costs, including lenders’ fees, which are higher than is the case in the 
liquid and efficient markets for government debt (Hellowell, 2015). For example, equity 
investors often hedge against certain risks (such as variation in inflation and interest rates) by 
purchasing financial derivatives. The associated fees and costs, which add to the costs of 
production for the private operator – and hence, ultimately, to the price charged to the 
public sector (Yescombe, 2008)7 - have no equivalent in the other mechanisms of delivery. 
In addition, the rates of return on commercial debt and equity may add to costs relative 
to other delivery mechanisms (Hellowell and Vecchi, 2012). The interest cost on private 
finance has been an important focus of academic research and official audit (e.g. McKee et al, 
2006; National Audit Office, 2015). It is normally a multiple of the interest rate that the 
government pays on its own debt. However, it is far from this clear that this is a relevant 
comparator, since debt is only one source of a government’s income, alongside taxes, fees, 
asset sales, interest on cash holdings, and so on. Determining the right approach to 
estimating the latter varies according to who is doing the analysis. From the perspective of a 
Ministry of Finance, the cost of using public finance now to invest in a project (as in most 
forms of conventional procurement), rather than ‘smoothing out’ those expenditures over 
the contract period (as in a PPP) is equal to the value of the next best alternative government 
spending project. In contrast, from the point of view of a Ministry of Health, or an individual 
healthcare organisation,8 the cost of loans from national/subnational governments, or from 
debt instruments issued directly by the organisation, may be the most relevant comparator.  
In both cases, evidence shows that costs are likely to be lower than the private operator’s 
weighted average cost of capital (Hellowell and Vecchi, 2010, National Audit Office, 2015, 
Colla et al, 2015). Hence, for PPPs to represent a cost efficient solution, any savings secured 
due to the incentives described in section 1 (above) must be sufficient to offset the higher 
interest costs of private finance, alongside the additional transaction costs. As noted, the jury 
is still out on whether this is a plausible outcome, and most analyses give considerable 
grounds for scepticism (e.g. Vining et al, 2005; Hellowell, 2010; Winch and Onishi, 2012). 
                                                          
6 For more on this point, e.g. Boardman and Vining (2004) and Daniels and Trebilcock (1996). 
7 We will also see in sections below that such instruments can increase considerably the costs to the public 
sector of terminating PPP contracts. 




4. WHAT DETERMINES THE BENEFITS AND COSTS?  
The sections above have recorded a number of variables that are likely to affect the 
outcomes from PPPs in terms of their ability to deliver goods in accordance with the 
timetable, cost and level of quality set out in the contract. In respect of endogenous variables 
(i.e. those that are relatively amenable to being addressed through policy action), the 
economic benefits of PPPs are dependent on adequate arrangements being in place, or put in 
place, for the specification, monitoring and verification of contractor performance. All of 
these activities are very costly. But if they are not effectively undertaken, contracts do not 
generate the risk transfer mechanisms needed to create the incentive framework that gives 
rise to good outcomes. Hence, decision-makers need to assess whether they are able to:  
(i) identify their long-term service requirements; 
(ii) codify these in a set of measurable indicators;  
(iii) monitor outcomes against those indicators; and 
(iv) pay when those outcomes are acceptable, and ensure they do not pay when they 
are not.  
It is apparent that, where government capacity is limited, PPPs – especially in complex areas 
of activity, such as acute diagnostic, therapeutic and curative care (i.e. the services delivered 
in hospitals) - are unlikely to yield good outcomes, even in terms of cost- and quality-
certainty.9 However, where markets are mature and purchasers have the skills required to 
write and enforce contracts, the empirical evidence suggests that such predictability is 
achievable. 
In terms of exogenous variables (that is, those that are not amenable to being 
addressed through policy action), it is evident that the price paid for such certainty could be 
high unless there is adequate competition for both the operational and financial components 
of the deal. On the operational side, decision-makers should consider in which service areas 
the private sector is large enough, diverse enough and competent enough to generate 
meaningful competition. It is likely that more complex service areas are associated with 
greater concentration in the market. More competition might be feasible for simpler facilities 
and simpler services – suggesting these may be a more appropriate starting point.  
On the financing side, securing low interest costs has become difficult everywhere. In 
OECD markets, changes in financial sector regulation and concerns about the quality of assets 
held by banks have restricted long-term lending across the world and increased its price.10 
Investors are likely to favour mature markets in which contract models are well-understood 
and have a track record of delivery (and a strong pipeline, to justify the transaction costs). 
Lenders will similarly favour tried and tested approaches, and contract forms that facilitate 
the use of assets with relatively short maturities (Hellowell et al, 2015). In developing 
countries, financial markets are often ill-equipped to provide the long-term financing 
                                                          
9 While evidence is lacking, it may be that simpler PPPs that focus on investment in specific facilities, and/or the 
management of specific clinical services (e.g. ambulatory surgery centres, diagnostic services, renal dialysis), 
may be more appropriate in such contexts. 
10 Basel III stability ratios, in particular, make long-term loans very expensive in terms of banks’ risk-weighted 
capital adequacy requirements (Reviglio 2012). 
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required for infrastructure projects. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the longest available 
loan tenor is five years or less, and even where longer loan terms are available, interest rates 
are typically high compared with OECD countries (Irving and Manroth 2009). Although, in 
such contexts the economic costs of using public funds to pay up-front for an investment, 
rather than allowing such costs to be amortised over the contract period, are likely to be 
high, it is quite likely that the financial costs of private finance will be higher still. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
There may be considerable benefits to the bundling and risk transfer features of the 
PPP model, and much of the theoretical research has emphasised such benefits. However, 
these studies are almost exclusively based on deductive reasoning and, elegant as the 
analyses may be, they are unsupported by empirical data. It is apparent from the empirical 
evidence that PPPs hold promise for decision-makers who prioritise certainty - about costs, 
quality and service volumes. However, PPPs are also associated with additional costs – 
especially transaction costs and the costs of private financing. Perhaps the key decision that 
policymakers and managers need to make about their use of the PPP model is how much 
extra they are prepared to pay to achieve predictable cost, quality and service outcomes. 
The balance of benefits and costs are dependent on a range of variables. Decision-
makers need to pay close attention to such variables when deploying this complex and 
challenging mechanism of delivery. Such variables can be divided into endogenous and 
exogenous variables – though, even in the former case, their amenability to policy action may 
be limited. The capacity of public organisations to define what they need over the long 
duration of the contract, and to verify that this has or has not been delivered by the 
contractor, is dependent on the availability of specialist human resources. Putting this in 
place will often require ambitious cross-sectoral action. In terms of the external environment, 
adequate competition in supply, and the availability and price of capital finance, will influence 
the scale of additional costs. Decision-makers need to consider in which service areas the 
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